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Abstract
In this paper, we construct a joint production model of health with two-
sided asymmetric information and ask the question, "How should physicians
be compensated?" We demonstrate theoretically that the preferred physician
compensation scheme depends on the illness condition. Outcome-contingent
payments are better than effort-contingent payments for illnesses in which the
efforts of physicians and patients are highly complementary, or in which both
types of effort are important to the outcome. Effort-contingent payments are
superior when efforts are not highly complementary, or when either physician or
patient effort, but not both are important to the outcome. Evidence to support
this theory is provided by an empirical analysis of patient choice of health care
providers in Africa.
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1 Introduction
During the past two decades, academics and policy makers have placed increasing at-
tention on mechanisms to encourage physicians to provide appropriate levels of med-
ical care. Indeed, in the last ten years we have seen managed care exalted as a means
to reduce the over-provision of care, and more recently demonized as a mechanism
that encourages the under-provision of care. The debate continues, with both sides
entrenched and the question remaining, "How should physicians be compensated?"
In this paper, we propose a joint production model of health where both patient
and physician behavior affect outcomes. For example, treatment of an asthmatic
patient requires the doctor to make the correct diagnosis, prescribe appropriate med-
ications, and describe to the patient any behavioral changes needed to expedite her
recovery. Similarly, the patient must take the appropriate medicine and modify her
behavior. If the doctor does everything correctly, but the patient leaves the office
and immediately begins smoking and does not take her medicine as prescribed, the
doctor's effort will be wasted. If the doctor puts forth little effort and misdiagnoses
the patient or provides her with inappropriate information, any effort the patient
provides will likely be wasted. This concern is greatly exacerbated in an environment
where patients cannot evaluate their doctor's activities and doctors cannot evaluate
their patient's activities.
This representation of health production in an environment of double-sided asym-
metric information is a departure from previous models, which have generally treated
the information asymmetry as one-sided (Arrow 1963, Pauly 1980, Ellis and McGuire
1986, Dranove 1988, Reinhardt 1989). It is, however, consistent with commonly raised
concerns by physicians about patient compliance and commonly raised concerns by
patients about the quality of care they are receiving from their physicians. In this
context, the design of contracts that provide each party with the incentives to en-
gage in the appropriate level of effort is very important. With this in mind, we
analyze two specific physician compensation schemes: one outcome—contingent and
one effort-contingent.
Though double moral hazard has not been discussed in health care, the application
of this model has been discussed in other contexts, notably warranties (Cooper and
Ross 1985) and general production (Demski and Sappington 1991). Our model of
output-contingent contracts is similar to that of Cooper and Ross. The framework
of the paper follows the spirit of Weitzman (1975) and Maskin and Riley (1985) in
comparing compensation schemes in a 'second-best' framework.
This is not, however, a model constructed to represent all forms of production.
The assumptions about information and observability are designed to represent the
provision of health care. Effort-contingent payments can be thought of as a traditional
fee-for-service compensation scheme, where a third party capable of evaluating the
level and appropriateness of care determines the effort-payment schedule. Managed
care, with its modified forms of compensation based on physician profiling, utilization
review, capitation, and withholds and bonuses tied to utilization procedures can be
viewed as a first step toward linking payments and outcomes (Gold et al. 1995). In
fact, explicit outcome-contingent contracts for the provision of health care are found
outside of the U.S. and are gaining popularity domestically in areas such as repro-
ductive medicine and corrective eye surgery (New York Times 1999, Robertson and
Schneyer 1997). The assumptions of the model imply that relevant extensions will be
in areas where one of the agents providing effort offers services that can be evaluated
by a select group of agents, but not by the population at large. Professional services
such as law and accountancy, where trained professionals (who can be evaluated by
other professionals) produce a joint product with agents from the general population,
come to mind. The purchase of legal services can be made on a per-hour of con-
tingency basis. In the design of law, one can create negligence rules conditioned on
precautionary effort, or liability rules where accountability is based on outcomes (see
Shavell (1987)).
Our analysis suggests that either compensation regime can achieve the first-best,
i.e. full information, solution. In practice, however, these first-best solutions will
be difficult to implement. With outcome-contingent contracts it is effectively im-
possible to give physicians the full incentives to exert effort. Health is a good with
extreme valuations and doctors, in general, have a limited liability. Indeed, it is hard
to imagine a contract that calls for the execution of a doctor each time a patient
dies. Effort-contingent contracts, on the other hand, will generally fail to take proper
account of the role of patients in their own health. Optimality requires exertion of
physician effort to where its marginal benefit equals marginal cost. If patient and
medical effort are complements, the marginal benefit of medical effort will depend on
patient effort. Regulators are skilled in determining physician effort, but will have
difficulty observing or evaluating patient effort. Their choice of effort thus, cannot
always be optimal.
In this world, where outcomes are both the output of interest and observable,
economic intuition seems to suggest that outcome—contingent contracts would be
superior. However, the best way to compensate physicians depends on the char-
acteristics of the illness being treated. Specifically, when there are large degrees of
complementarity between patient and physician effort, compensation should be based
on outcomes. When the degree of complementarity is low, compensation should be
based on physician effort. In other words, surgery, where short-term success has lit-
tle to do with patient effort should be compensated based on physician effort, and
back pain that relies heavily on the effort of both participants should be based on
outcomes. The choice of effort or outcome contingent contracts does not hinge on
the importance of unobservable medical effort, but rather on the joint importance of
medical and patient effort. This result is worth emphasizing, as the authors are not
aware of any academic publication or policy debate that has raised this point.
The theoretical work is then tested using a data set on patient choice of health
care providers in Africa. In this setting, patients have no health insurance and can
choose which provider to visit for each and every illness condition. Non-governmental
health care providers - primarily missions - compensate physicians for their effort,
while traditional healers are paid based on outcomes. Using data on the elasticity
of health production with respect to unobservable patient effort and imobservable
medical effort, our theoretical results are confirmed. Patients with disease conditions
that are relatively responsive to patient and practitioner effort are more likely to seek
treatment from a traditional healer. When the disease is responsive to either medical
or patient effort, though not both simultaneously, patients visit mission centers. The
impact of responsiveness of illness conditions on the choice of provider is strong, and
patients appear to be willing to incur large costs in order to seek the appropriate
provider.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section presents a detailed theoretical
model of the joint production of health with two-sided moral hazard. Equilibrium
effort levels, utility, and social welfare when payment is effort contingent and when
payment is outcome contingent are analyzed. Section three tests our theoretical
results using a unique data set from Africa. The final section concludes.
2 A General Model of Health Care
We begin with an individual who has fallen sick from an unknown disease (but a
known illness condition, where the illness condition is described by the symptoms of
the patient). The given level of health is H. Health intervention might lead to a
change in the level of health, AH. We simplify the idea of health intervention by
assuming that there are only two possible outcomes; the worst outcome AH = h and
the best outcome AH = h. These outcomes depend only on the disease condition
and not on any characteristics of the patient or the practitioner. We think of h as
being a full recovery and h as being no change in the health status.
The probability of achieving either outcome is determined by two binomial distri-
butions, (p* is the 'true diagnosis' distribution and <fi® is the 'false diagnosis' distribu-
tion. We motivate these distributions as follows; if the patient's condition is correctly
diagnosed, and the proper treatment regime is prescribed, understood and followed,
the patient will have a probability of full recovery of q*. If the diagnosis is incorrect
the probability of recovery is g0. The probability of failing to recover is 1 — q* with
the 'true diagnosis' and 1 — q® with the 'false diagnosis.' In health, often everything
is done as it should be and the patient does not recover. On the other hand, patients
frequently recover when nothing has been done for their health (or when incorrect
actions have been taken).
Health care is a set of technologies that probabilistically span 0* and 00. A 'better'
technology is one that has a higher probability of choosing the 'correct diagnosis'
distribution than another technology. We represent the technology by e (0 < e < 1)
where
(1)
The 'best' technology (e = 1) has q* chance of leading to recovery, and the 'worst'
technology (e = 0) leads to a chance of recovery of q®.1
The properties of the two binomial distributions are given by the illness condition.
The patient cannot choose the distribution under which to seek health care, but she
does have some control over the magnitude of health technology (e). e is generally
a function of patient effort, patient skill, practitioner effort and practitioner skill.
Unobservable efforts imply that the patient does not ever observe e, only whether
the outcome was h or h. Since both outcomes are possible with all e the patient can
never impute physician effort even if she knows her own level of effort, her own skill
and the practitioner skill. Thus, patients can only expect incentive compatible effort
which varies according to the means of physician compensation.
1We deliberately based this description of AH on the Spanning Condition of Grossman and
Hart (1983) and the Linear Distribution Function Condition of Hart and Holmstrom (1987), which
will allow us to characterize incentive compatibility constraints as first order conditions or relaxed
incentive compatibility constraints.
2.1 The Value of Health
Utility from health can be modeled in a variety of different ways. We follow the
basic model of Grossman (1975) and consider health as increasing the hours of time
available to consume work and leisure as well as augmenting utility directly. Thus
U = (H, /(H), c(p)), where H is the health level, I(H) is the income potential at
that level of health, p is patient effort and c(p) is the disutility of patient effort. An
increase in H leads to an increase in utility through a direct as well as an income
effect.
The expected value of health is
EU = eq*U + e(l - q*)U + (1 - e)q®U + (1 - e)(l - q®)U (2)
U = U\h,(I(h)-C),c(p)]
C is the total cost of a visit. We assume a separable utility form such that U =
U'[H, I(H)} — C — c(p). Although income and total costs are measured in the same
units and need not be separated, we choose this formulation for the following reasons.
The income (or earning potential of the patient) and health level for good outcomes is
the same whether the patient sought health care or not; it depends on the outcome,
not the process. Thus the part of utility inside the utility operator (U'[H,I(H)])
depends on the outcome, not on the effort exerted. Costs and disutility have a linear
relation to utility. For ease of exposition we write U'[h, l(h)] as U' and U'[h, I(h)] as
Uf. Thus,
EU = (e(q* - q®) + q%) U' + ( l - q® + e(g0 - q*)) V - C - c(p) (3)
Of interest to the patient is the change in expected utility. We choose as a natural
comparison the utility when no health care is sought (e = 0). The change in the
expected utility is therefore
AEU = e(q* - q®) • (U1 - U') - C - c(p) (4)
At this point we make a number of further simplifying assumptions. First, we assume
that U_f is equal to zero, a simple scaling assumption. Furthermore we assume that
utility from health comes from a fixed health affect, h • w (where w is the per unit
value of health) and an increased amount of time for leisure or work, h • w (where w
is the opportunity cost of healthy time.) We cannot separate these two effects and
therefore use the combination of effects, h • LJ (where u = w + w.) Thus,
AEU = e(q* - q^cuh -C- c(p)
Without loss of generality we define the technology for health production as being
a standard production function divided by a 'maximum' level of production for that
function, e = h/h. Thus, where e varies between 0 and 1, h varies between 0 and h.
AEU = (q* - q®)ujh -C- c(p) (5)
For simplicity we will refer to AEU as U.
2.2 The Health Production Technology
The health production technology (h) is viewed as a search for the proper treat-
ment regime. This search is a complex function of a number of different inputs; a
production function of health. We assume the following factors are important in the
production of health: medical effort, patient effort, medical skill and patient efficiency
at transforming health inputs into health. An increase in any of these factors, ceteris
panbus increases the probability of choosing the 'true diagnosis' distribution. The
role of each of these factors will vary according to the illness condition.
The health production technology is represented as a Cobb-Douglas production
function.
h = npamfi (6)
where n is the productivity factor, p is the patient effort, a is the elasticity of output
with respect to patient effort, m is medical effort and (3 is the elasticity of output
with respect to medical effort. The productivity factor is an increasing function of
the skill of the practitioner and the skill of the patient (efficiency of the patient
in transforming health inputs into health). We will not specify a functional form
for 7T, but it is increasing in both medical and patient skill. There are decreasing
returns to scale in the production of health and therefore we assume that 0 < a < 1,
0 < P < 1 and 0 < a + (3 < 1. For simplicity of notation we will refer to the product
of productivity, the value of health and the difference in probability with full effort
and with no effort (Truj(q* — q®)) as A. This variable can be thought of conceptually
as the value of obtaining health care, a measure that embodies the benefits from
being healthy and the ability of the practitioner (relative to letting the disease run its
natural course) to provide that health. We assume that disutility of effort is a linear
function of the effort, and normalize the coefficient for patient effort to one, with a
coefficient of D for practitioner effort.2
2.3 Production with Full Information
As a basis of comparison for the cases with asymmetric information, we will first
analyze the utility maximization for the case with full information. This case cor-
responds to a world where both the practitioner and the patient observe the other's
2This is more general than it would seem at first. Consider the standard model of Cobb-Douglas
with exponential disutilities (Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine 1995) where social welfare would be
represented by Ap°"mP 1 ; Iy-. Since patient and medical effort and their responsivenesses
have no intuitive units we can arbitrarily define a new variable as follows: p = p'k;m — m'T; a =
ka';p = lp' with the result : S = Ap'$'m'a> - £p' - } m'. Defining A = A'£ and D = * | we obtain
S — (Ap'P m'a — p' — Dm' j | which is functionally the same as the equation we will work with.
effort and there is no coordination problem. Social welfare is the utility from health
net of effort costs.
ApamP -p-Dm. (7)
Maximizing welfare with respect to p an m we obtain:
l
mP - 1 = 0 (8a)
(3Apam13-1 -D = 0 (8b)
These conditions simply state that the marginal productivity of each input equals the
marginal cost of that input. Together, these first order conditions allow us to define
an optimal level of patient and practitioner effort that are simply a function of the
value of health care, the marginal productivities of effort, and the costs of effort.
pf, = a I^Aa" iPIDf) """" (9a)
m*FI = (f3/D(Aaa {(3/Df) T ^ (9b)
The subscript FI denotes the full information solution. These expressions for optimal
effort levels can then be employed to determine social welfare and practitioner and
patient utility.3
UFl = (1 - a) (Aaa (P/Df") ^^ (10a)
= (1 - a - P) [Aaa {(5/pf^j T=S=? (10b)
It should be clear that social welfare under any regime with informational asym-
metries can at best be equivalent to social welfare with perfect information. In the
3We assume that patients retain the full value of their health, minus the disutility of their effort
and a fixed fee (which we drop for notational simplicity). This derivation of utility makes the most
sense in the health context (where fees are generally fixed). Social welfare more accurately reflects
the surplus created in a general context.
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regimes that follow, we will concentrate our analysis on both patient utility and social
welfare. The reasons for the additional focus on patient utility are twofold. First,
patient welfare is often the impetus behind the design, or redesign, of health care in-
stitutions and regulations. Second, our empirical analysis will examine patient choice
of practitioner, a comparison in which patient utility and not social welfare drives
behavior.
2.4 Joint Production with Dual Unobservable Effort
Here patients cannot observe practitioner's effort and vice versa, i.e. a world with joint
production and double-sided asymmetric information. We introduce a social planner
who can implement contracts and whose goal is to maximize welfare. The social
planner can observe medical effort and outcomes, but not patient effort. One can
think of the social planner as a regulator with the resources and the skills to observe
and evaluate the activities of practitioners. Given these abilities, the social planner
can design an effort-contingent payment system. Alternatively, the social planner
can design contracts that reward both the patient and the practitioner according
to outcomes. We will show that in a second-best world, where effort-contingent
contracts cannot incorporate behavioral responses of patients or where physicians
and/or patients do not retain the full value created by health outcomes, neither
payment scheme is uniformly superior. Social welfare is maximized through outcome-
contingent contracts for some illnesses and through effort-contingent contracts for
others.
2.5 Effort—Contingent Contracts
The social planner, since he can observe medical effort, can choose the level of medical
effort. However, he cannot observe patient effort. When medical and patient effort
are complements (as they are with our choice of production function) the optimal
level of medical effort depends on the level of patient effort and therefore the social
10
planner will not be able to force the practitioner to exert the socially optimal level
of effort. We model the lack of information as a social planner who sets m assuming
patient effort is invariant to medical effort. The social planner does know that patient
effort is important in health, but does not know (or cannot model) how patient effort
reacts to medical effort. The social planner maximizes welfare assuming p = p.
mP -p-Dm (11)
The first order condition for the social planner's maximization problem is:
mP-1 -D = 0 (12)
The marginal productivity of medical effort, evaluated at the social planner's estimate
of patient effort, p, is equal to the marginal cost of medical effort. However, the patient
does not stay idle. The patient responds to practitioner effort through her choice of
effort. The reaction function of the patient is determined by the first order condition
of the maximization problem above with respect to p.
aApa-lmp - 1 - 0 (13)
This expression is identical to equation (8a) in the full information context. Patient
effort will be provided to a point where the marginal productivity of that effort, taking
into consideration the level of medical effort, is equal to the marginal cost of patient
effort. We can combine these first order equations to determine optimal expressions
for patient and practitioner effort, patient utility and social welfare (equations (14a
11








The subscript E denotes the effort-contingent solution. C/pi is the full information
utility and pF I is the level of patient effort under the full information solution. When
P = PFI ^n e foil information solution will obtain. When p < pFI , practitioner effort
decreases at the expense of patient utility. The practitioner is not working hard
enough. When p < pFI , practitioner effort increases to the benefit of patient utility.
The practitioner is working too hard.
Social welfare under effort-contingent contracts is equal to full information social
welfare when p = pF I . When p > pF I or when p < pFI welfare under the effort based
contracts is strictly less than welfare under full information. Patient utility can be
greater than under full information because the patient does not have to compensate
the practitioner for working too hard. However, welfare can never be greater than
full information welfare.
2.6 Outcome-Contingent Payments
In this case, the medical practitioner and the patient receive payment as a function
of output. We call the share to the patient sp and the share to the practitioner sm.
The social planner seeks to maximize welfare choosing the levels of the shares. The
optimal solution will be the case where each share is equal to 1, where both patient
and practitioner face the full incentives. In general the shares will not be equal to one.
As we have stated, it would be difficult to set the practitioner share to 1 since this
would imply that he would experience the same disutility from cancer, for example,
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that the patient experiences. The patient share may also be bounded away from one
due to risk sharing arrangements, such as disability, life or health insurance. The
social planner will set these shares at their highest possible levels, but they will not
generally be one. Given the share, the patient seeks to maximize her utility, which is
now represented as
spApam/3-p (15)
Similarly, the practitioner will maximize his utility, which can be represented as
smApamP - Dm (16)
The two agents play a Nash game and equilibrium is found where each player's choice
of effort is equal to the other players expectation. The social planner plays no role
beyond choosing the shares and implementing the terms of the contract. He does not
need to observe m and cannot observe p. Equations (17a - 17d) are the equilibrium
levels of patient effort, medical effort, patient utility and social welfare for outcome-
contingent contracts.
Po = spa (Aaa((3/Df) ^  (S^JT^P (17a)
mo = sm (P/D) (Aaa({3/Df)^ ( ^ d ) 1 ^ (17b)
Uo = UFlsp(s«si)^ (17c)
Wo = (1 - spa - Srn(3) (Aaa((3/Df)T^ {s^J^ (i7d)
The subscript O denotes the outcome-contingent solution. Note that sp(SpS^l)l-a-f3
becomes 1 when sm and sp are both equal to 1; each participant receives the full
rewards for their effort. In this case the full information solution obtains. When
either sm < 1 or sp < 1 or both then sp(SpS^JI-*-/J is less than one. Either the
patient or the practitioner, or both, do not face the full incentives to provide effort,
so they each under-provide it. Patient utility and social welfare under outcome-
13
contingent contracts are inferior to patient utility and social welfare under the full
information solution.
2.7 Effort- vs. Outcome—Contingent Payments
Now we are ready to compare patient utility across regimes. The difference in utilities
can be represented as follows:
UO-UE = UFI (sp{s?si)^ - (-^-)(I-«KU) ) (18)
We cannot sign this expression without knowledge of p. Clearly if p is very small
then Uo > UE- On the other hand, if p is very large then Uo < UE- We do not
know p a priori, but if p is fixed we can determine the conditions under which Uo
is most likely to be greater than UE and when Uo is least likely to be greater than
UE- Define p as the value for p when patient utility is equivalent in both regimes.
Thus, by construction, when p > p, the expression above is negative and patient
utility is larger when physician compensation is effort-contingent. When p < p, the
opposite is true, p is fixed and therefore Uo is more likely to be greater (less) than £/E
when p is larger (smaller). The magnitude of p depends on the nature of the disease
condition, specifically the elasticity of health production with respect to patient and
practitioner effort. Therefore, regime performance can be characterized through an
analysis of changes in p with respect to a and /3.4
4Note that a given illness condition is denned by a and (3 and therefore a and /3 do not change.





5p(^2k)/3 and sp are always less than one. If p^ and TTIQ are greater than one, all three
derivatives above are positive. Inputs with values greater than one is the standard
Cobb-Douglas assumption, but takes on special meaning in this context.5 In this
model, the level of inputs supplied is endogenous, so we cannot assume that patient
effort and medical effort are greater than one, but must examine the conditions nec-
essary for this result to obtain. Ensuring that PQ and TUQ are greater than one simply
requires that seeking health care is valuable relative to the costs of effort.6 If this were
not the case, one would imagine that the health care market for this disease would
not arise. For example, patients do not generally seek medical care for a bruised
elbow because the benefit to jointly producing health with a physician is not worth
the effort. Therefore, if health care is worth seeking, §f, if, and •§^L are all positive.
The signs of the ft derivatives imply that utility in the outcome-contingent regime
5This assumption is standard because when the inputs are less than one, increases in the pro-
ductivity of an input yields lower levels of output. This peculiar property occurs because fractions
raised to a higher power produce smaller numbers.
6A must be 'large' compared to both 1 and D. Since A has no directly measurable units, but is
meant to capture value, 'large' means that the value of health care exceeds the effort costs. When
A is 'large' increasing the elasticity of outcomes with respect to either effort increases the utility of
the patient. In other words, when medical effort (for example) is more productive, patient utility is
improved.
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is most likely to exceed utility in the effort-contingent regime when a and (5 are both
large. In other words, outcome-contingent payment schemes are best for disease
conditions when both physician and patient effort are productive. The intuition
is straightforward. When both productivities are high, a feedback mechanism is
necessary so that one agent's effort encourages provision by the other. This feedback
is achieved by conditioning payments on outcomes, which are, of course, a result of
joint effort. When physician effort is productive, but patient effort is not, payment on
physician effort is sufficient. When patient effort is productive, but physician effort is
not, the compensation scheme of the practitioner is unimportant when patients face
the full incentives, which they do under effort-contingent contracts but do not under
outcome-contingent contracts.7
Proposition 1 In a second-best world, the physician compensation scheme preferred
by patients depends on the illness condition. Outcome-contingent payments are better
than effort-contingent payments for illnesses where the marginal productivities of both
patient and physician effort are high. Effort-contingent payments are better than
outcome-contingent payments for illnesses where the marginal productivity of medical
or patient effort is high, but not both.
The proof is above. Second-best, in this and all subsequent references, implies
sp < 1 or sm < 1 and p constant. The welfare implications are similar, though not as
straight-forward to illuminate.
Wo - WE = 1-a-P
a 1 / f V \ (1-«)(1-^) \ fj off \
(1 -
 Spa - Sm/3) (s%si)—e - h - Q - / J M l ) (.£.)<.-„,<.-» (20)
\ \PFI/ ) PFI /
When health care is valuable (m^j > 1 and p\Y > 1) both full information welfare
) a n d patient effort (pFI) are increasing in both a and (3. When p = pFI (the
7Note that the above holds true when both sp < 1 and sm < 1. If sp = 1 then outcome-contingent
contracts will be superior to effort-contingent ones in this case.
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Figure 1: Full Information, Outcome-Contingent and Effort-Contingent Welfare as
p Changes
social planner happens to have guessed patient effort correctly), welfare under effort-
contingent contracts is equal to welfare in the full information case (WE = WFI).
Welfare under outcome-contingent contracts (Wo), on the other hand, is never equal
to full information welfare (WFi) if sm < 1 or sp < 1. Thus, when p = pFI , wel-
fare under outcome—contingent contracts is less than welfare under effort-contingent
contracts (Wo < WE).
Figure 1 represents full information, outcome—contingent and effort-contingent
welfare as p changes. Neither WFI nor WQ change with p. As discussed earlier,
outcome-contingent welfare is always less than welfare under full information. Effort-
contingent welfare is equal to full information welfare at the point where p = pFI.
However, welfare under the effort contingent contract is strictly less than full informa-
tion welfare (WE < WFI) at all points where p ^ pFj, both p < pFI and p > pFI . Thus
outcome—contingent welfare (Wo) c a n potentially be greater than effort-contingent
welfare (WE) both when p is small and when p is large. For small values of p, physi-
cians provide insufficient effort which yields low levels of health production and, in
turn, low levels of social welfare. When p is very large, health production levels are
high but at the expense of physician effort, again yielding low levels of social wel-
fare. These points where the regime producing greater social welfare switches are
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represented on Figure 1 as PLOW a n d PHIGH- For this reason there is not a unique
counterpart to p as there was in the case of patient utility; there will, in general, be
two p's.
If we examine Wo — WE at the point p (where UQ = UE) we obtain the following
Wo - WE (Uo = UE) = x W™_ pK8™)1^ ( l - smp -sp + (3smsf\ (21)
1 — sm/3 — sp + fismSp is always greater than 0 when sp < I.8 Thus, expression 21 is
always positive.
Proposition 2 In a second-best world, when outcome-contingent patient utility is
equal to effort-contingent patient utility, outcome-contingent welfare is superior to
effort-contingent welfare.
The proof is above. Furthermore,
Proposition 3 In a second-best world, when outcome-contingent patient utility is
greater than effort-contingent patient utility, outcome-contingent welfare is always
superior to effort-contingent welfare.
For proof see the appendix.
Figure 2 is a graphical representation of the relationship between utilities and
welfares in the outcome-contingent and effort-contingent worlds. Figure 2 is a two
dimensional representation of all possible a and (3 pairs. Any illness condition is
represented by a point on the graph. Shown are two isoquants; the iso-utility line
which represents all illness conditions for which the patient utility under outcome-
and effort-contingent contracts are equal (for a given A, D, sm, sp and p) and the
iso-welfare line representing all points where welfare is equal across the two regimes.
x dl l-sm0-sp+s£ f3s j i £
8 When sp = 1 , 1 — smf3 — sp + Sp j3sm = 0, and for all sp —^  ^ -^ = smsp0 - 1,
which is always negative. In the limit, as sp approaches 1,1 — sm(3 — sp + Sp j3sm approaches 0 from
































Figure 2: Iso-Utility and Iso-Welfare lines with Nash and Blind Social Planner Con-
tracts
The fact that these two lines are close to each other in a(3 space is a robust result
and does not depend on our choice of A, D, sm, sp and p. For any illness condition
in region II both utility and welfare with outcome-contingent contracts are superior
to that with effort-contingent contracts. In region I, both utility and welfare are
superior with effort-contingent contracts. Region III represents the area where welfare
is superior with outcome-contingent contracts, but utility is superior with effort-
contingent contracts. We do not know whether any specific area of this figure is
populated with an actual illness condition (there might not exist any illness condition
for which a = 0.95 and f3 = 0.04, for example), but we can see that conditions for
which both a and (5 are large simultaneously are more likely to populate the area in
which outcome-contingent welfare and utility are superior to effort-contingent welfare
and utility.
We have been able to derive unambiguous results for patient utility and show that
social welfare closely follows these results. Whenever health care is worth seeking,
illness conditions with a high a and (3 are likely to lead to higher social welfare and
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patient utility if they are treated under an outcome-contingent regime. When both
a and (3 are high, conditions exhibit a high degree of effort complementarity, where
complementarity implies that both efforts are necessary for the treatment of the illness
condition. On the other hand, for illness conditions in which either a or (3 is large,
but not both, social welfare and patient utility are higher under effort-contingent
regimes. Here efforts do not exhibit high degrees of complementarity. One effort or
the other is necessary, but not high levels of both.
3 Empirical Evidence
We submit that it is surprising that we can test this theory at all. We will not be able
to obtain measures of social welfare, as is almost always the case with empirical work.
Even patient utility depends crucially on the patient's valuation of her own health
at both outcomes, information that is difficult to collect reliably. However if patients
have expectations of the outcome (and the value of this outcome) we should be able to
observe some sort of revelation of preferences if patients choose practitioners for each
illness condition. In other words, if one contract is "better" than another in some
cases, we should observe that patients are more likely to seek that contract in those
cases than otherwise. In the South-West province of Cameroun, and indeed in most
of Africa, patients have a wide variety of choices available to them and we observe
that patients exercise this choice. The same individual is likely to visit a wide variety
of practitioners over her lifetime and patients claim that they evaluate the condition
from which they suffer before they choose a practitioner to visit. Of particular interest
to this paper is that two of the practitioners available use the contracts described in
the theoretical section of this paper. We will briefly discuss some important features
of the data.
Traditional healers in Africa in general, and specifically in Cameroun, are paid only
if the patient is cured (after a fixed fee). Thus, traditional healers offer an outcome-
contingent contract. The value of outcome is shared between healer and patient
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according to a sharing rule, such that sp + sm = I.9 Implicit or explicit contracts
are negotiated between patients and healers before the healer diagnoses the patient.
Although patients often pay healers very little, when they are cured payments can
be substantial. Healers feel no obligation to accept every patient though they refuse
patients infrequently. As part of the data collection effort described below extensive
interviews were conducted with a few healers. These interviews are discussed in
Leonard (1998).
The second type of provider of interest to this work is the church-operated health
system (hereafter referred to as the mission). Missions are seen as the "high quality"
providers in this area. Patients pay a fixed fee to the mission and practitioners are
monitored and compensated by their employers. If their effort levels are deemed to
be within protocols, they are financially rewarded. If they are deemed below accepted
standards, they are punished. Practitioner compensation at this institution is effort
contingent. There are two types of mission health facilities available to patients in our
data set, clinics and hospitals. Clinics and hospitals fall under the same hierarchical
management within churches and we therefore assume that the contracts offered at
these two locations is similar. Providers at clinics and hospitals have different levels
of skill.
To test our theory we use data on individual choices of practitioner collected
in Mbonge Sub-Division, in the South-West province of Cameroun in 1994. Forty
villages were randomly chosen and twenty randomly selected households from each
village were interviewed. Data were collected on all members of the household. 4,489
individuals were thus polled, and 681 illness episodes were reported within the month
previous to the survey. Of primary interest to this work was the first location visited in
the search for care and 252 of these episodes resulted in first visits to either traditional
healers, mission clinics or mission hospitals. The other major source of health care is
9This is an example of a balanced budget contract. In the absence of a third party who can
credibly inject or remove output, all contracts between two parties must be balanced: payments
from one party must equal the payments received by the other party. This has a very important
effect on contracts with dual unobservable effort and implies that the full information solution can
never be obtained (Holmstrom 1982).
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the government health system (289 visits) with drug peddlers, pharmacists, neighbors,
private hospitals, private clinics and parastatal hospitals rounding out the sample.10
Despite its wealth (relative to other areas of Cameroun and Africa) and the im-
portance of commerce, roads in this area are terrible. There is only one all weather
road, and many of the villages surveyed are far from roads with any transportation
infrastructure. Nevertheless, we observe significant bypassing of facilities. To com-
pensate for vastly different road conditions we use the transport cost per kilometer to
normalize all distances to the distance your fare would take you on the main (paved)
road in the sample area. Nearly 80% of all visits were to a provider who was not the
closest provider, suggesting a strong revealed preference for the care that is available
there.
We suggest that it is information that patients possess about the illness from which
they suffer that drives them to incur significant cost in the search of care. The survey
polled respondents on the characteristics of the episode from which they suffered:
all of the symptoms they experienced; the self-declared severity of the disease; the
number of days sick before seeking care; and the number of those days in which the
patient was bedridden. With these characteristics of the disease plus the age and
sex of the individual and information about endemic diseases in the area (but not
information on the choice of provider or the diagnosis), two doctors and one nurse11
(all experienced in rural tropical medicine) independently scored all the cases using
the following definitions:
Responsiveness of the condition to Medical Effort The degree to which out-
come depends on the effort of the practitioner. This is our estimate of (3.
Responsiveness of the condition to Patient Effort The degree to which out-
come depends on the effort of the patient. This is our estimate of a.
1OA11 of the regressions reported below were also run with the government as a third type of
institution from which patients could choose and none of the coefficients on the choice between
traditional healers and missions were significantly affected.
nWe are indebted to Dr. Hailemariam, Dr. Djomand and Ms. Pouani for their assistance in this
endeavor.
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Responsiveness of the condition to skill Patients can choose between three lev-
els of skill and capacity: untrained or informally trained providers (correspond-
ing to traditional healers), providers at clinics and providers at hospitals. This
variable represents three data points for each illness condition. This is our
estimate of TT, which is a major component of A.
Outcome Range What is the possibility for a very bad health outcome given the
disease from which the patient suffers? This is an estimate of (q* — g0), an
important element of A.
In addition to these three sets of scores, we created scores for each case using basic
medical references (Griffith 1985, Strickland, ed 1984, Werner 1977).12
The codings are correlated, albeit not perfectly. The key informational content
in these codings is ordinal ranking of disease properties. Creating an average score
from the four codings necessarily treats them as cardinal rankings and unnecessarily
discards valuable information. Taking the average, therefore makes little sense and
rather than merge these four data points, we treat them as four different data sets
and test each one individually.
3.1 Estimation
Patients choose providers on the basis of the expected utility at that provider, minus
fixed costs and travel costs. Expected utility will be affected by the contract under
which medical and patient effort are delivered as well as the skill of the provider in
question. The fixed costs are constant and are therefore not a source of variation,
but travel costs differ significantly. We know the distance to the nearest mission
clinic and hospital for each individual but we do not know the distance to the nearest
traditional healer. We know that there are many healers and that they are widely
dispersed and therefore assume that travel costs to traditional healers are zero.
12The data for this survey as well as correlation tables of the scores discussed above are available
online at the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research at the University of
Michigan (Study #1138).
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Individuals choose between two types of providers and three locations. Types
(indexed by k) are traditional (TH) - outcome-contingent payment - and missions
(M) - effort-contingent payment. The locations (indexed by j) are traditional (TH),
mission clinic (MC), and mission hospital (MH). Thus A;=TH if j=TH and fc=M if
j=MC or MH. Coefficients are obtained by maximizing the following log likelihood
with respect to 77,7 and p.
tii3i°&pij ( 2 2 a )
i= l jG{TH,MC,MH}
Pi3 =
G{TH,MC,MH} exP\rlmXi + 7 Vim + Pkzi)
6{j = 1 if the i'th individual visits provider j and 0 otherwise.
a; is a vector of characteristics of the individual. There is only one vector per indi-
vidual, but there are three sets of coefficients, representing the three locations between
which a patient can choose.13 x includes individual income, household wealth14, years
of schooling and a dummy variable for whether or not the patient is an adult. Thus,
for example, any patient has only one level of income, but income has a potentially
different effect at each of the three providers. The characteristics of individuals are
included to control for the possibility that the observed bypassing is done by only a
select group of individuals and is not a function of the illness condition: a hypothesis
the results reject, y is a vector of information about the locations visited. The data
varies across providers but the coefficient does not.15 y includes the travel cost to
each provider and the skill of the provider for the illness condition reported. Thus,
while each provider potentially has a different travel cost the effect of travel cost is the
same at each provider; for this variable two providers each 100 kms from the patient
13This is the standard multinomial logit framework.
14To get a measure of household wealth we estimated total household income and regressed this
on observable characteristics of the household (employment type, construction of primary residence,
ownership of consumer durables, etc.) and used the predicted household income as a measure of
household wealth.
15This corresponds to the McFadden Conditional Logit.
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are treated as the same, z is a vector of information about the illness condition and
is therefore only one vector of information with two sets of coefficients representing
traditional healers and missions, z includes the elasticity of the given condition to
patient effort (a), the elasticity with respect to medical effort (/?), the product of the
two (a • (3) and the outcome range for the given condition. Each illness condition has
only one set of characteristics but these characteristics can have different effects at
a traditional healer than at a mission.16 Note that in order to solve the model we
normalize 7TH and PTH to zero. The entire regression is just a specific case of the
more general conditional logit model (Maddala 1983, pp 44) and therefore has the
required properties for obtaining a solution.
3.2 Results
In running the regressions that follow, after controlling for other important variables,
we are looking for the following patterns. We expect that patient utility at traditional
healers is higher than at missions when effort complementarity is high; when a and
(3 are both large. We expect that patient utility is higher at missions when effort
complementarity is low; when a or /? are large but not both simultaneously. Thus
we have included the product of a and (3. When a • (3 is large, the probability of a
visit to a mission should decrease. When a • (3 is small and when a or (3 is large the
probability of a visit to a mission should increase. Thus, when the visit to the mission
is the visit we are trying to explain, the coefficient for a and (3 should be greater than
zero and the coefficient for a • (3 should be less than zero.
Table 1 displays the results of the logit regression on the four data sets17. The
coefficients for the individual characteristics are not reported, but were part of the
regressions and have therefore been controlled for. The coefficients for the first four
variables can be read as the effect of the variable on the likelihood of a visit to a mission
16Adding the additional terms p'kZk has the same effect as restricting some of the coefficients in
the r) vector to be equal to each other.
17We differentiate between scorings by individuals with medical expertise from the coding by
reference to medical texts. However, we choose not to identify individuals coders with their scores.
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Table 1: Conditional Logit Coefficients





































































individual characteristics (income, household wealth, schooling and adult)
controlled for but not reported
log likelihood -213.02
^significant at 99% for one-sided test
fsignificant at 97.5% for one-sided test
-224.15 -227.17 -222.99
provider (either a clinic or hospital) over a traditional healer. Thus, increasing a or
/3 increases the probability of a visit to a mission provider in the first three data sets.
However, increasing the size of the product reduces the likelihood of a visit in those
first three data sets. Thus when /3 is large, increasing a decreases the probability of
a visit to a mission, increasing the probability of a visit to a traditional healer. None
of the illness condition characteristics are significant on the 3rd individual coding.
The coefficients on the last two variables (the 7 vector) can be read as the effect
of the variable on the likelihood of a visit to each provider. Thus when the cost of
travel to any given provider increases the likelihood of a visit to that provider falls.
Skill does not appear to have any significant affect on the probability of a visit after
controlling for a, (3 and the outcome range.
Table 2 reports the marginal impact of the variables on the probability of a visit
to any given provider for the first data set (coding by medical references). The entries
can be read as follows. Increasing the outcome range by 1% leads to a decrease of
0.2% in the probability of a visit to a traditional healer, an increase of 0.1% in the
probability of a visit to a mission clinic and a 0.1% increase in the probability of a visit
to a mission hospital. The elasticities with respect to a and (3 reported in the table
combine the direct and interaction effects. The effect of an increase in a or (5 from
26





a at low (3
a at /3
a at high (3
(3 at low a
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Low indicates 20th percentile and high indicates 80th percentile
their mean values depends on the magnitude of the other elasticity. When (3 is low,
increasing a decreases the probability of choosing an outcome-contingent contract
(the traditional healer), but when j3 is large increasing a increases this probability.
The same pattern holds for (3 with respect to a.
Patterns of patient choices between contracts display exactly the characteristics
predicted by a model of two-sided asymmetric information. Outcome-contingent
contracts are preferred when a and (3 are both large. Effort-contingent contracts are
preferred when a alone is large or when (3 alone is large. These results are significant
in three out of the four data sets that we collected. They are robust to empirical
specifications and offer strong support that patient utility is affected by the contract
available at any given provider.
4 Conclusions
The existence of double-sided asymmetric information, where physicians cannot ob-
serve patient behavior and patients cannot observe physician behavior, is an im-
portant problem in health care that has received little attention in the economics
literature. This paper develops a model that attends to these informational concerns
and compares the relative performance of two physician compensation strategies: one
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where compensation is effort contingent, and one where compensation is outcome
contingent. These two strategies can be viewed as stylized representations of existing
payment schemes that include such things as capitation, salary, physician profiling,
and traditional fee-for-service compensation.
Our analytic results indicate the need for compensation regimes that vary accord-
ing to disease conditions. There is no one-size-fits-all solution. When patient effort
and physician effort are highly complementary, physician compensation should be out-
come contingent. When the two efforts are not very complementary, effort-contingent
payments are better. In so far as effort complementarity is specific to medical specialty
areas, we should compensate each specialty accordingly. It is important to recognize
that these results can be generalized to a wide range of service industries that are
often characterized by production in teams with two-sided information asymmetries.
These industries range from legal services to electronics and automobile repair and
the framework developed here may provide insight into the scope and limitations of
such things as warranties and money-back guarantees, which can be thought of as a
means of transforming effort-contingent payments to outcome-contingent ones.
Evidence to support this theory is provided by an empirical analysis of patient
choice of health care providers in Africa. The analysis provides strong evidence for
the principal theoretical result. Patients with disease conditions that are relatively
responsive to patient and practitioner effort are more likely to seek treatment from
a traditional healer who is paid based on outcomes. When the disease is not partic-
ularly responsive to one of the two types of effort, patients visit effort-compensated
physicians at mission health care providers. Elasticity measures with respect to effort
complementarity are large and on the same scale as the significant travel costs facing
patients in this area. Contracts matter crucially in this context, and offer reason to
believe that they matter in health care markets outside of Africa as well.
The framework developed here has been kept relatively basic for analytic simplic-
ity. Given the stochasticity of health production, and in turn patient and physician
utility, future research should extend this analysis to the case where agents are risk
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averse. In this case, the differential ability of agents to bear risk should also play
a vital role in determining appropriate compensation schemes. Additional research
should also examine the role of monitoring and the legal system in the social planner's
derivation of p, the social planner's expectations of patient effort. A deeper under-
standing of the institutions and norms that govern health care provision will enhance
our ability to overcome these informational market failures.
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A Proof of Proposition 3
Recall that the difference welfare under the two regimes is:
Wo - WE = FIl-a-0
The difference is positive if
(20)
a 1 / / V \ ( ) ( fj a/3
(1 - spa - smf3) (sis;)^ - 1 - a - fi ( -£- (JL)<i-><.-« > o
\PFI/ ) P
q(l-a-ff)
^ - 1 - a - fi ( -£- (JL)
(23)
Recall that p is the value of p for which the utility under the two regimes is equal.
We introduce a notation for p, p = pt. When t is equal to one therefore, p — p and
we have the solution outlined in equation (21). When t is less than 1, p < p and we
are in the territory described in figure 2 as region II, where the utility with outcome-
contingent contract is greater than the utility with effort-contingent contracts. Thus
to prove proposition 3, we need to show that when t is less than one, equation (23)
always holds.
We start with the fact that when t = 1 equation (23) is positive by proposition 2.
Let g denote the expression in equation (23). Taking the derivative of g with respect
to t we obtain
dg ( ±£
 a I-*-? \ i-a-p (5
Since either sp or sm is always less than or equal to one, with one strictly less than
one, -gj; < 0 whenever t is less than one — it is increasing as t falls toward 1. If ^  is
decreasing in t when t is less than one, and g is positive when t is equal to one, then g
must be positive whenever t is less than one. Thus the difference between welfare with
outcome-contingent contracts and welfare with effort-contingent contracts is always
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positive when p < p, or when UQ > UE- QED.
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